In a landmark advisory opinion, the Supreme Court addressed fourteen detailed questions of law referred by President Droupadi Murmu concerning the powers of state Governors under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. The verdict provides clarity on how Bills become law in states, the Governor’s discretion, and limits on judicial intervention.
Key Highlights of the Ruling
1. What options does a Governor have when a Bill is presented under Article 200?
The Court held that under Article 200, a Governor has three constitutional options when a Bill is presented by a state legislature:
- Grant assent, thereby making the Bill into law.
- Reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President under the second proviso to Article 200.
- Withhold assent and return the Bill to the legislature with comments for reconsideration.
Importantly, the Court clarified that there is no option to “withhold assent simpliciter” (i.e., keep the Bill pending indefinitely without returning it).
2. Is the Governor bound by the aid & advice of the State Cabinet when exercising these options?
The Court said:
- Ordinarily, yes, the Governor acts on the aid & advice of the Council of Ministers.
- But in exercising his constitutional discretion under Article 200 (for example, reserving a Bill or returning it), the Governor enjoys inherent discretion and is not strictly bound by the Cabinet’s advice.
3. Are the Governor’s choices under Article 200 justiciable (open to judicial review)?
- The merits of the Governor’s decision (i.e., whether it was wise or not) are not justiciable.
- However, prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite inaction (e.g., sitting on a Bill without any decision) is reviewable. The Court may direct the Governor to act.
4. Does Article 361 (Governor’s immunity) bar judicial review entirely?
No. While Article 361 gives personal immunity to the Governor, it does not shield the office from judicial scrutiny of inaction under Articles 200/201.
5. Can the courts impose timelines for a Governor (or President) to assent to Bills under Articles 200/201?
- The Court held that Articles 200 and 201 do not prescribe specific time-limits for assent.
- Therefore the judiciary cannot rigidly impose timelines in all cases through orders.
- The idea of “deemed assent” (i.e., a Bill automatically becoming law if no decision within a prescribed period) was rejected.
6. Are the President’s powers under Article 201 similarly structured?
Yes. The Court held that the President:
- Has discretion under Article 201 when a Bill is reserved for his consideration.
- Is not required to seek the Supreme Court’s opinion every time under Article 143 when a Governor reserves a Bill. The President’s subjective satisfaction is sufficient.
7. Can courts review Bills before they become law (i.e., before assent)?
No. The Court ruled that the judiciary cannot adjudicate the contents of a Bill before it receives assent and becomes a law. Judicial review concerns laws, not Bills.
8. Can the Court use Article 142 (its power to do “complete justice”) to substitute the Governor’s or President’s decision (for example, to give “deemed assent”)?
No. The Court held that Article 142 cannot be used to usurp the constitutional role of the Governor or President by giving “deemed assent” or substituting their domain.
9. Does a Bill become law without the Governor’s assent under Article 200?
No. Unless the Governor grants assent (or the President in case of reservation under Article 201), a Bill cannot become law.
Implications of This Verdict
- The ruling strengthens the federal structure, reaffirming the constitutional roles of state Governors with checks and balances.
- It curbs the misuse of indefinite delays by Governors in assenting to Bills, while preserving their discretion.
- It clarifies the boundary between judicial review and executive discretion: courts may intervene in inaction, but may not substitute discretionary decisions with their own.
- It sends a message that political or administrative inertia by Governors is not immune from judicial oversight.
- On the flip side, it restricts courts from imposing hard deadlines or “deemed assent,” thus preserving flexibility for constitutional actors.
